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I. Introduction 
Economic theory predicts that in long-run com-
petitive equilibrium the price of a good or service 
will equal the minimum average costs associated 
with the most efficient production technology-
firms that have inefficient technologies and 
higher average costs will not survive. The coexis-
tence over long periods of time of alternative 
technologies performing the same function thus 
poses an interesting economic puzzle. Prominent 
examples are alternative distribution systems for 
the same or sImilar financial service, such as full-
service and discount brokers for performing 
securities trading; automatic teller machines and 
human tellers for distributing cash; banks, sav-
ings and loans, and credit unions for delivering 
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Property-liabIlIty insur-
ance IS distnbuted 
through a direct-writer 
system, where agents 
represent one lllsurer, 
and an independent-




have hIgher costs than 
direct writers. The 
market -impe rfections 
hypothesis attributes 
the coexistence of the 
two types of insurers 
to impediments to com-
petition, whtle the 
product-quality hypoth-
esis holds that indepen-
dent-agency insurers 
provide hlgher-quahty 
servIces. We measure 
cost efficiency and 
profit effiCiency for 
property-liabIlIty in-
surers and find strong 





outputs and are com-
pensated by higher rev-
enues. 
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depository servIces; and banks and capital markets for providing loans 
to busmesses (Fama 1985). 
This article focuses on a partIcularly interesting case of financial-
services distribution, property-liability insurance. Property-liability in-
surance is distributed by two different types of firms: direct-writing 
insurers that distribute insurance through exclusive agents who repre-
sent only one insurer, and independent-agency insurers that distribute 
their product through independent agents who represent multiple insur-
ers. These systems have long interested researchers because they have 
coexisted in insurance markets for many decades, even though indepen-
dent-agency insurers are known to have higher costs (e.g., Joskow 
1973; Cummins and VanDerhei 1979; Pauly, Kunreuther, and Klein-
dorfer 1986; Kim, Mayers, and SmIth 1996). The purpose of this article 
is to analyze the reasons for the long-term coexistence of the direct-
writing and independent-agency dIstribution systems. 
Two primary hypotheses have been advanced to explain the coexis-
tence of the two systems. According to the market-impeifections hy-
pothesis, independent-agency insurers survIve while providing essen-
tially the same services as direct-wnting insurers because of market 
imperfections, such as pnce regulation (Joskow 1973; Cummins and 
VanDerhei 1979; Weiss 1990), slow diffusion of information in insur-
ance markets (Berger, Kleindorfer, and Kunreuther 1989), or search costs 
that permit inefficient firms to survive alongside efficient firms (Dahlby 
and West 1986). Under the market-impeifections hypothesis, effiCIent 
firms are expected to earn supernormal risk-adjusted profits, while mef-
ficient firms will earn risk-adjusted profits closer to normal levels. 
In contrast, according to the product-quality hypothesis, the higher 
costs of independent -agency insurers represent expenses associated 
with producing higher product quality or greater service intensity, such 
as providmg additional customer assistance with claims settlement, of-
fering a greater variety of product choices, or reducing policyholder 
search costs (Pauly et aI. 1986; Kim et al. 1996; Regan and Tennyson 
1996). This hypothesis predicts normal risk-adjusted profits for both 
direct-writing and independent-agency firms. 
The product-quality hypothesis Imphes that firms are sorted into 
product-quality or service-intensity market niches, WIth customers who 
prefer higher quality paying more for the product. The higher prices 
receIved by the higher-quality providers cover their extra production 
costs, allowing these firms to survive in equilibrium. This rationale 
is broad enough to encompass agency-theoretic explanations for the 
eXIstence of alternative technologies (e.g., Mayers and Smith 1981; 
Kim et al. 1996). For example, principal-agent problems, such as 
company/buyer incentive conflicts, may be more important to some 
buyers or for some product vanants, leading to the survival of dIstribu-
tIOn systems that deal efficiently with thIS type of incentive conflict. 
Thus, independent-agency insurers may survive because they more ef-
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fectively discipline insurers into paying legitimate claims promptly and 
fairly. Independent agents can credibly threaten to shift business to an 
alternate insurer because their contracts with insurers convey owner-
ship of the policyholder list to the agent (i.e., the company cannot ap-
proach policyholders directly), whereas exclusive agents usually do not 
have this ownership right. 
Because product quality in insurance is essentially unobserved, re-
searchers have been unable to reach a consensus on whether the market-
imperfections hypothesis or the product-quality hypothesis is more 
consistent with the observed cost data. This lack of consensus leaves 
open the interesting economic question of whether the market works 
well in minimizing product-distribution costs and leaves unresolved 
the issue of whether marketing costs in property-liability insurance are 
excessive and perhaps should receive regulatory attention. I 
This article proposes a new methodology for distinguishing between 
the two hypotheses. Usmg frontier efficiency methods, we estimate 
both cost and profit efficiency for direct-writing and independent-
agency insurers. Measuring cost efficiency enables us to determine 
whether the cost efficiency difference between direct-writing and inde-
pendent-agency insurers found by prior researchers persists under our 
methodology. Measuring profit efficiency helps to identify unobserved 
product-quality differences because customers should be willing to pay 
extra for higher quality. Thus, our approach allows for the possibllity 
that one group may provide higher-quality service on average and be 
rewarded with higher average revenues that are reflected in profit effi-
ciency. That is, the profit-efficiency approach allows for the possibllity 
that some firms may incur additional costs providing superior service 
and be compensated for these costs through higher revenues. 
A key statistic in our analysis will be the proportion of the difference 
in measured cost efficlency between the firms employing the two distri-
bution systems that remains when we estimate profit efficiency. If most 
of the measured cost-efficiency difference remains as a profit-efficiency 
difference, then the market-imperfections hypothesis would be sup-
ported. In this event, the profit efficiency, which includes both cost 
efficiency and revenue efficiency, would reinforce the efficiency differ-
ence between the two groups. In contrast, if most of the measured cost-
efficiency difference is eliminated when the more encompassing profit 
efficiency is measured, then the product-quality hypothesis would be 
supported. This event would be consistent with the difference in service 
quality being reflected in higher revenues. 
By way of preview, we find data on 472 insurers over the period 
I Regulators In several states, including CalifornIa, Flonda, and Massachusetts, have 
argued that the hIgh costs of automobIle Insurance are partly attnbutable to Insurer ineffi-
cIency In marketing, admlntstratlOn, and claims settlement and that such ineffiCIenCIes 
should be dISCIplined through pnce regulatton 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
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1981-90 to be fairly consistent with the product-quality hypothesis. 
We measure independent-agency insurers as less cost efficient on aver-
age than direct writers, but most ofthis measured cost-efficiency differ-
ence does not translate into a profit-efficiency difference. Indeed, after 
conditioning on firm characteristics, such as size and business mix, the 
profit-efficiency difference between the two groups of firms is quite 
small and not statistically significant, even though a large, significant 
cost-efficiency difference is still present. 
The article is organized as follows. Section II summarizes some of 
the problems encountered in the extant empirical literature and dis-
cusses in an intuitive manner how our methodology addresses these 
difficulties. Section III gives the details of our methodology and model 
specification. Section IV discusses the measurement of inputs, outputs, 
and prices in property-liabihty insurance, and Section V describes the 
data set. Section VI presents "simple" tests based on the average effi-
ciency differences between direct-writing and independent-agency in-
surers, and Section VII provides" sophisticated" tests, which condition 
on other firm characteristics that may affect efficiency. Section VIII 
concludes. 
II. Methodological Difficulties in the Extant Literature 
Three major methodological problems have been encountered in the 
literature on insurance distribution systems. First, product quality is 
essentially unobserved. If some firms incur additional costs in provid-
ing a hIgher-quality product to consumers, such as extra assistance with 
claims settlement or greater product variety, this may be incorrectly 
identified as cost inefficiency unless proper controls for product quality 
are used. Ex ante, we might expect better service from independent 
agents because they can offer customers choices among the products 
of many insurance companies, perhaps better tailoring the insurance 
product to the needs of the individual customer. In addition, indepen-
dent agents may be more likely to act as advocates for customers in 
claims-settlement disagreements than exclusive agents since indepen-
dent agents are not tied to the individual insurer and can threaten to 
steer business elsewhere if settlements are unsatIsfactory (see Kim et 
al. 1996). Unfortunately, control variables for insurance product quality 
are generally lacking in the data sets available to researchers.2 
In this article, we estimate profit efficiency, which incorporates both 
cost and revenue efficiency and should net out most of the unobserved 
differences in product quality. In an efficiently functioning output mar-
2 Although pnor research has consistently shown mdependent-agency msurers to have 
higher costs than direct wnters, It IS not obvIOUS a pnon that thiS should be the case For 
example, mdependent-agency msurers might benefit by shanng their agents' fixed costs 
With other msurers, Yleldmg lower costs than direct wnters However, any such gams may 
be diSSipated m praclice because of the difficulty of dealmg With multiple sets of fOflllS, 
procedures, and computer systems by mdependent agents. 
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ket, customers who prefer higher-quality insurance services will pay 
more for these services, compensating the firm with additional revenues 
that cover the extra costs of providing the higher-quality services. 
The second major difficulty encountered in empirical studies of the 
product-quality versus inefficiency issue lies in the specification of the 
null and alternative hypotheses. Most previous studies took as the null 
hypothesis that all property-liability insurers have the same managerial 
competence or efficiency. As the alternative hypothesis, these studies 
allowed the predicted costs to differ only by a constant for the firms 
in the direct-writer and independent-agency groups (e.g., Joskow 1973; 
Cummins and VanDerhei 1979; Pauly et al. 1986). That IS, the main-
tained hypothesis for these tests was that there were no efficiency dif-
ferences within either group, with the alternative hypothesis only 
allowing for a crude shift in efficiency between the two groups. 
Advances in the measurement of efficiency have rendered such com-
parisons obsolete. Frontier studies of efficiency in the insurance indus-
try by Weiss (1990); Bughin (1993); Cummins and Weiss (1993); 
Fecher et al. (1993); Gardner and Grace (1993); Yuengert (1993); and 
Cummins and Zi (in press) found very significant dispersion in effi-
ciency both within groups of insurers and between groups of insurers, 
clearly rejecting the maintained hypothesis of only one or two effi-
ciency levels for all insurers. 
In contrast to the prior studies comparing distribution systems in 
property-liability insurance, we use frontier efficiency models to allow 
for efficiency differences within each group of insurers. That is, each 
firm is allowed to have its own level of efficiency. We conduct two 
sets of tests. Under our simple tests, the null and alternative hypotheses 
are that the average efficiencies of the direct-writer and independent-
agency groups are equal and unequal, respectively. Under our sophisti-
cated tests, the null and alternative hypotheses are that the efficiencies 
of direct-writing and independent-agency firms are equal and unequal, 
conditional on other factors not fully under the control of insurers in 
the short run. To conduct the sophisticated tests, we regress the mea-
sured cost and profit inefficiencies on variables representing firm orga-
nizational form (stock vs. mutual form of ownership), product mix, and 
size as well as dummy variables for the direct-writer distribution sys-
tem versus the independent-agency distribution system. The sophisti-
cated version enables us to test whether direct writers have different 
expected costs or profits than mdependent-agency firms for delivering 
the same output mix and quantity within the same organizational form. 
The third major difficulty in the prior literature is that the cost func-
tions specified were often ad hoc. Generally, output was measured by 
a single proxy variable-total losses or premiums-despite the 
multiproduct nature of the property-liability insurance business (e.g., 
Joskow 1973; Braeutigam and Pauly 1986; Pauly et al. 1986). Subse-
quent literature on frontIer efficiency in financial services has allowed 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
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for mUltiple products and typically used the standard translog cost func-
tion specification (e.g., Weiss 1990; Cummins and Weiss 1993). The 
issue of the coexistence of the two distribution systems for property-
liability insurance has not been investigated using these multiproduct, 
frontier efficiency techniques. 
The latest efficiency studies of financial institutions have taken two 
further steps, which we combine in our empirical analysis. First, in 
addition to analyzing cost efficiency, we also analyze profit efficiency, 
which incorporates both cost and revenue efficiency and can help ame-
liorate problems of unobserved product-quality differences (see Berger, 
Hancock, and Humphrey 1993; Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 
1997; Akhavein, Swamy, Taubman and Singamsetti 1997). Second, we 
adopt the Fourier-flexible functional form for our cost and profit func-
tion, a global approximation that has been shown to dominate the com-
monly specified translog form in fitting financial institution data (see 
McAllister and McManus 1993; Mitchell and Onvural 1996; Berger, 
Leusner, and Mingo 1997). Global approximations are particularly im-
portant when studying an industry like insurance, where firm scale and 
product mix vary widely. Local approximations, such as the translog, 
often perform poorly at points well away from the mean and thus are 
potentIally quite inaccurate for describing much of the data. 
As an addItional check on the results, we also estimate efficiency 
from an alternative profit function that replaces the output prices in 
the standard profit function with output quantities, effectIvely treating 
output scale and mix as fixed (see Humphrey and Pulley 1997). Testing 
the sophIsticated version of the hypotheses and estimating two different 
profit-function specifications helps to ensure that our conclusions are 
not affected by differences in firm characteristics or equation specifica-
tion. 
III. Methodology and Econometric Model Specification 
Cost efficiency is defined as the minimum costs that could have been 
expended to produce a given output bundle divided by the actual costs 
expended (cmm!i:;act), both adjusted to be predicted values in order to 
remove random error that temporanly makes costs high or low. The 
cost-efficiency ratio may be thought of as an estimate of the proportion 
of total costs or resources that are used efficiently. The ratio varies 
over the range (0, 1], with higher numbers indicating greater efficiency. 
Similarly, profit efficiency IS the ratio of predicted actual profits to the 
predicted maximum potential profits that could be earned (ic"c'/icm"X). 
Thus, the profit-efficiency ratio estimates the proportion of potentIal 
profits that are realized. Profit effiCIency is also maximized at one, 
where predicted actual profits equal potential profits. The range of profit 
effiCIency is (-00, I)-there is no minimum since profits can be nega-
tive of any magnitude. 
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As explained below, we report estimates of inefficiency rather than 
efficiency in order to facilitate comparisons between the cost and profit 
function results. The dollar value of cost inefficiency equals actual 
costs minus minimum costs and thus represents the part of actual costs 
that is wasted because of inefficiency. Similarly, the dollar value of 
profit inefficiency equals potential profits minus actual profits and thus 
represents the part of potential profits that is lost because of ineffi-
ciency. We will divide both measures of inefficiency by the same de-
nominators to make them comparable below. 
Our efficiency analysis utilizes the' 'distribution-free" methodology 
introduced by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and modified by Berger 
(1993). This approach avoids imposing arbitrary distributional assump-
tions on the data in order to separate inefficiencies from random error. 
Instead, we simply assume that inefficiencies are persistent or stable 
over time, whereas random error tends to average out over time. Other 
efficiency methods typically require quite restrictive distributional as-
sumptions concerning the random errors and inefficiencies that affect 
costs, profits, or production. 3 
Formally, we refer to inputs and outputs as "netputs" and distin-
guish between variable and fixed netputs in our cost and profit models. 
The vector Y == (Yb Yo, YF) denotes the netput vector containing n vari-
able inputs Yb m variable outputs Yo, and q fixed netputs YF, with the 
variable inputs YI measured negatively so that for both inputs and out-
puts the Y values give the net supply by the firm. The fixed netputs are 
inputs or outputs that are taken as given by the firm because they are 
difficult to change in the short run. The vector P == (p b Po, P F) denotes 
the corresponding price vector. 
The cost functIOn for insurer i, which takes as exogenous the input 
prices P b variable outputs Yo, and fixed netputs Y F, is specified as 
(1) 
where VC is variable costs PI . YI (multIplication dot indicates inner 
product); C(Pb Yo, YF) is a cost function with input prices, variable 
outputs, and all fixed netputs as arguments; In Uc is an efficiency factor; 
and In ec is a random error term. ThIS composed error, In Uc + In e" 
will be separated out below using the assumption that the efficiency 
factor In u( is stable over time, while the random error In ec tends to 
average out over time. 
The profit function is specified very simIlarly to the cost function: 
(2) 
3 The assumption that effiCienCIes are relatively stable over tIme has been supported 
by earher research (see Berger and Humphrey 1991, 1992, Berger 1993) See Berger, 
Hunter, and Timme (1993) for a diSCUSSIOn of alternative effiCIency-measurement tech-
mques 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
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where n denotes profits plus a constant described below, In u" is an 
efficiency factor, and In e" is a random error term. The major difference 
between the two functions is that variable output prices Po in the profit 
function replace variable output quantities Yo in the cost function. Un-
der profit maximization, the firm is free to choose the variable outputs 
to maximize profits and failure to do so results in measured profit inef-
ficiency. Thus, profit inefficiency includes cost inefficiency from non-
optimizing levels of inputs plus revenue inefficiency from nonoptimiz-
ing levels of outputs.4 
The Fourier-flexible functional form used for the cost and profit 
functions includes both pure Fourier trigonometric terms (cosines and 
sines) and a standard translog. In forming the trigonometric terms, we 
adjust each of the price and output terms to lie within the interval [0, 
2n] before taking cosines and sines. For notational convenience, we 
define ZC to be the transformed values of the cost-function arguments 
(Ph Yo, YF) and z" to be the transformed values of the profit-function 
arguments (Ph Po, YF).5 
The Fourier-flexible form for the cost function may be written as 
n n n 
In C(Ph Yo, YF) = a + I <p,lnp, + 112 I I <P'J Inp,lnpJ 
1=1 ,=1 J=I 
m+q m+q m+q 
+ I ~r In Yn+r + 112 I I ~rs In Yn+r In Yn+s 
(3) 
n+m+q n+m+q 
+ I I [01] cos(z~ + z~) + elJ sin(z~ + z~)] 
,=1 J=I 
+ nfq nfq nfq [OIJk cos(z~ + z~ + zD + elJk sin(z~ + z~ + zDl 
k=J 
4 Because profits may be nonpOSltlve and logs can only be taken of pOSItive numbers, 
we mclude in 7t the value one plus the absolute value of the largest negative profits m the 
sample That IS, the dependent van able for firm k at tIme t IS In 7t" "" In (PROFIT., + I 
+ iPROFITmmJ), where PROFIT" IS measured profits and mm mdlcates the sample mml-
mum, which IS negatIve ThIS modIfication IS made for all observations. 
5. We cut 10% off of each end of the [0, 27tj mterval to reduce approxImation problems 
near the endpomts Thus, for each argument of the cost or profit functIOn In x, we form 
the adjusted vanable z "" .21t - Jl a + Jl In x, where [a, bjls the range of In x and Jl "" 
(9 21t - .1 21t)/(b - a) 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
Multiple Distribution Systems 523 
Thus, each of the input prices, variable output quantities, and fixed 
netput quantities appears in the translog and Fourier functions, up to 
the second order in the translog and third order in the Fourier (time 
and finn subscripts are suppressed for notational convenience). The 
standard symmetry restrictions apply to the translog portion of the func-
tion (<\l'J = <\lJP ~n = ~sr)' The profit function has exactly the same 
functional form and the same number of tenns as the cost function; 
that is, it includes the standard translog tenns and the same number 
and type of trigonometric terms. The only difference IS that output 
prices (Po) appear in the standard profit function in place of the output 
quantities (Yo) that appear in the cost function (wIth the appropriate 
change in the z terms as well). The alternative profit function is exactly 
the same as the cost function, the only difference being the dependent 
variable. Actual profits are used as the dependent variable in both the 
standard and alternative profit functions. 
We use the same functional fonn for the cost and profit functions 
so that any differences we observe in measured cost and profit efficien-
cies are due to the efficiency concept (i.e., cost efficiency vs. profit 
efficiency) and not to the choice of functional form. Using the same 
functional fonn enables us to avoid confounding inefficiency differ-
ences with specification differences. The alternative profit function and 
the cost function not only have the same functional fonn but also have 
exactly the same right-hand side varIables as well. 
The models are estimated using a pooled cross-section, time-series 
sample of 472 Insurers wIth continuously available data over the 10-
year period 1981-90. Inefficiency is estimated for each finn by averag-
ing its residuals over the lO-year period, truncating the distribution of 
average residuals across finns, and then computing efficiency relative 
to the finns with the best average residuals (lowest for costs, highest 
for profits). Specifically, under the dIstribution-free method, the cost-
function error term for insurer k at time t On Uckt + In eckt) is treated 
as a composite error term, and the average of the 10 residuals for each 
insurer k IS calculated. This average residual, denoted by In UCb is an 
estimate of In Ucb given that the random errors In eckt tend to cancel 
each other out in the averaging.6 The estimated cost efficiency for finn 
k, EFFcko is then calculated as 
(4) 
6 Because the averaglllg procedure IS Imperfect, the average residuals still contam some 
error from the In e,k, not fully canceling out over the IO-year penod as well as standard 
estimatIOn error ThiS error IS likely to be largest for msurers near the extremes of the In 
Utk'S, winch may have had persistently "lucky" or "unlucky" random errors that did not 
fully average out For thiS reason, we compute truncated measures as m Berger (1993), 
settmg the top and bottom 5% of the In U'k'S to the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. 
of their dlstnbutlOns 
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where In a:;'In is the minimum In ack and acts as an "anchor" so that 
the firm with the lowest average cost function residual is measured as 
being 100% efficient. 
Profit efficiency is computed similarly to cost efficiency.7 Our mea-
sured profit efficiency ratio, EFF"b is an estimate of the ratio of pre-
dicted profits for insurer k to the predicted profits for the most efficient 
insurer, both evaluated at the mean levels for the profit function re-
gressors for firm k. 8 
IV. Definition and Measurement of Outputs and Inputs 
This section briefly discusses several measurement issues in con-
structing the data set. We first describe the process for choosmg which 
services to measure as outputs in property-liability msurance. We then 
show how we measure the output and input quantities and prices used 
in the cost and profit functions. More detailed information IS available 
from the authors. 
Definition of Insurance Output 
Insurers are analogous to other financial firms in that their outputs con-
sist primarily of services, many of which are intangible. Three principal 
approaches have been used to define outputs in the financial services 
sector: the asset or intermediation approach, the user-cost approach, 
and the value-added approach (see Berger and Humphrey 1992). We 
adopt a modified version of the value-added approach here, which 
7. We use total profits 10 construct1Og the dependent vanable for the profit functIOn 
rather than vanable profits, which would be analogous to vanable costs If output pnces 
and quanlilies were measured perfectly, the dependent vanable 1C would be appropnately 
measured us10g vanable profits However, It IS Important for studY10g the queslion at hand 
to allow for the pOSSibility that output pnces and quanhtles may not be measured well, 
Ie, that there may be Important product-quality differences that are not 1Ocorporated 10 
these measures. Thus, we allow for the pOSSibility that firms us10g one of the dlstnbutlOn 
systems may be more effiCient on average If they proVide higher (unmeasured) product 
quality on average and receive higher revenues refiect10g thiS 
8 A comphcat1Og factor IS that actual profits are not mulliplicahve m the effiCiency 
factor u. because of the addlhon of an extra constant (one plus the absolute value of the 
largest negahve profits) before loggmg the profits The effiCiency rallO for firm k will 
therefore depend somewhat on the level of the regressors 10 the profit funchon, so we 
evaluate effiCiency at the mean values of the regressors for the firm. Formally, for 10surer 
k, we compute the average predicted value of the dependent vanable In 1Cfred as the 10ner 
product of the regressIOn coeffiCients and the mean regressors for firm k plus the average 
reSidual In U.k (truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles as above). The value that the 
dependent vanable would take for a fully effiCient firm fac10g firm k's mean regressors 
IS In 1Cj~ = In 1C~red + In u;"" - In U.b where In u;" IS the maximum value of the In U.k 
dlstribuhon (after truncatIOn). Undo1Og the logs and subtract10g the constant (1 + IPROF-
ITnunl) from both predicted and maximum profits gives PROFITl"d = exp(ln 1Cl"d) - (I 
+ IPROFITmml) and similarly for PROFITjax The profit-effiCiency ratIO IS thus given by 
PROFITl"d/PROFITjax 
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counts as important outputs those that have significant value added, as 
Judged using operating cost allocations. 
Property-liability insurers provide three principal services: 
1. Risk pooling and risk bearing. Insurance provides a mechanism 
for consumers and businesses exposed to property-liability losses to 
engage in risk reduction through pooling. The actuarial, underwriting, 
and related expenses incurred in pooling are major components of value 
added in the industry. Insurers also add value by holding equity capital 
to bear the residual risk of the pool. 
2. Real services relating to insured losses. Insurers provide a vari-
ety of real services for policyholders, including risk surveys, coverage 
design, loss-prevention serVIces, and loss-settlement services. By con-
tracting with insurers to provide these services, policyholders can take 
advantage of insurers' extensive experience and specialized expertise 
to reduce costs associated with insurable risks. 
3. Intermediation. Insurers collect premiums in advance of loss 
payments and hold the funds in reserves until claims are paid, similar 
to corporate debt. Policyholders receive a discount in their premiums 
to compensate for the opportunity cost of the funds held by the insurer, 
analogous to interest payments on corporate debt. The borrowed funds 
are invested primarily in marketable securities. 
Obtaining precise information on value added in property-liability 
insurance is difficult, but some rough estimates are available to help 
identify outputs. In 1994, about 32.0% of total industry operating ex-
penses (expenses other than paid and incurred losses) were for loss-
settlement services, the primary real service provided by the industry. 
About 65.8% of operating costs were accounted for by marketing and 
administratIve costs. Some of these costs are attributable to real ser-
vices but the majority, such as actuarial, underwritlllg, and administra-
tive costs, are attributable to the risk pooling/bearing function. The 
remaining 2.2% of operating expenses were absorbed by the intermedi-
ation function. The small percentage of operating costs attributable to 
intermediation reflects the fact that property-liability insurers invest al-
most exclusively in marketable seCUrIties. 
A strict application of the value-added approach would identify risk 
pooling/bearing and real services as important outputs and intermedia-
tion as an unimportant output. However, in view of the amount of assets 
controlled by insurers (about $705 billion in 1994) and the importance 
of investment income as a source of revenue for the industry, we elected 
to retain the intermediation function in defining industry output. This 
is particularly important in estimating the profit function in view of 
the fact that insurers rely on investment lllcome to cover the premium 
discount for the use of policyholder funds. A small amount of ineffi-
ciency in lllvesting these funds could easily wipe out all profits. 
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Measurement of Output Quantities 
Unfortunately, transactions flow data to measure insurance outputs, 
such as the number of applications processed, the number of policies 
issued and renewed, the number of claims settled, and so forth, are not 
available. However, a satisfactory proxy for the amount of risk pooling/ 
bearing and real insurance services provided is the present value of 
real losses incurred. Losses incurred are defined as the value of claims 
that are expected to be paid as the result of providing insurance cover-
age during a particular period of time.9 Because the objective of risk 
pooling/bearing is to collect funds from the policyholder pool and eq-
uity providers and redistribute these funds to those who incur losses, 
proxying output by the amount of losses incurred seems quite appro-
priate. 
There are two drawbacks to the use of discounted real losses as the 
metric for insurance output, both of which are addressed by our use 
of the profit function. First, although services are likely to be highly 
correlated with real losses for both direct writers and independent-
agency firms, measured losses will not capture any systematIc differ-
ences between direct writers and independent-agency insurers in the 
levels of service intensity per dollar of loss. Such differences in inten-
sity levels, such as additional help to customers in loss settlement or 
policy choice, likely cannot be well measured by losses or by any other 
observable variables. Use of the profit function may help ameliorate 
this problem, since the unmeasured extra service will create revenues 
that tend to offset the costs of providing the service. 
The second drawback of using losses incurred to measure insurance 
output is that its use ignores the output qualitIes of loss control and 
risk management. An insurer that is very successful in its underwriting 
and loss-prevention practices will incur fewer losses for the same 
amount of premiums written but will be measured as having less output. 
Similarly, a firm that is relatively successful at managing its risks will 
9 The measure of losses we use IS calendar year (CY) losses mcurred The CY losses 
mcurred mclude the compames' current estimates (as of the end of year t) of losses mcurred 
due to coverage proVided m year t, Ie, aCCident year (A Y) losses mcurred, as well as the 
loss reserve adjustment (LRA), which represents the addition to (or subtractIOn from) A Y 
losses m year t due to revISIons m reserves for pnor years' losses We Illclude the LRA 
m our loss measure because excludmg It would result III our uSlllg a prelzmmary measure 
of output rather than actual output We Illclude the LRA III the year III which the adjustment 
IS made rather than the year of ongm of the poliCies glVlllg nse to the adjustment because 
the LRA reflects new mformatlOn on the frequency and/or seventy of claims that becomes 
aVailable m year t and also reflects services such as legal-defense and loss-adjustment 
services proVided m year t rather than the year of ongm As a practical matter, the year 
to which the LRA IS aSSigned IS likely to have mlmmal effects m any case, given our use of 
the dlstnbutlOn-free approach to measunng effiCiency Under thiS approach, the estimated 
mefficlencles are averaged across the sample penod for each firm so that any errors re-
sultmg from the misassignment of output wlthm the sample pen ad tend to average out 
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earn higher risk-adjusted average profits for it owners. Fortunately, our 
use of the profit function at least partially ameliorates these measure-
ment problems as well-insurers that have higher-quality underwriting 
and loss prevention or superior risk management will have higher aver-
age profits and higher measured profit efficiency, all else equal. Such 
differences are not generally reflected in cost efficiency. 
Because risks, payout patterns, and service intensity vary by line 
of business, we disaggregate losses into four subcategories: short-tail 
personal lines, short-tail commercial lines, long-tail personal lines, and 
long-tail commercial lines.1O Because insurers report their losses in-
curred at undiscounted values, we discount the losses to present value 
using estimated industry-wide payout patterns. ll The discounted losses 
are then expressed in real 1982 dollars by deflating by the consumer 
price index (CPI).12 
In addition to our four insurance outputs (long- and short-tail per-
sonal and commercial lines), we also account for the intermediation 
function of borrowing from policyholders and investing the funds in 
marketable securities. The intermediation output is measured by the 
mean of total real invested assets for the year, with the CPI (base year 
is 1982) used as the deflator. 
Measurement of Output Prices 
The conventional measure of the price of insurance 10 prior research 
is the markup of premiums over losses; that is, the ratio of premiums 
to losses minus one (e.g., Pauly et al. 1986). However, the premium 
represents the present value of expected losses, expenses, and profits, 
whereas losses are reported as undiscounted values. To measure insur-
ance output prices accurately, it is necessary to separate the price of 
insurance from the cost of funds borrowed from policyholders by com-
paring premiums with the present value of losses (see, e.g., Winter 
10. "Short-taI\" and "long-tail" refer to the length of time between policy mceptIOn 
date and when the bulk of the loss payments have been made. In short-taIl lines such as 
auto collisIOn, the lag IS usually less than 2 years, while for long-taillmes such as commer-
cial liability some losses may remam unpaId for 10 or 15 years 
11 The discount rates are based on the U.S Treasury Yield curves reported by Coleman, 
Fisher, and Ibbotson (1989) and updated through 1900 using data from other sources 
Payout patterns are estimated from data reported m Best's Aggregates and Averages 
(A M Best Co , vanous years) We estimate the payout proportIOns usmg the method 
prescnbed by the Internal Revenue Service for obtaming the present value of losses for 
tax purposes 
12 Losses mcurred mclude an estimate of expected mflatlOn between the reporting date 
(year t) and the prOjected claIm settlement dates Thus, dlscountmg at Treasury Yields 
ImpliCitly expresses losses for year t at the pnce level applicable to that year, assummg 
that Treasury Yields mclude a component for expected mflatIOn. Deflatmg by the CPI then 
expresses the discounted losses for the vanous years of the sample penod In real tenns 
For a diSCUSSIOn of the ratIOnale for thiS procedure, see Kraus and Ross (1982) 
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1994). Thus, we measure the prices of the four insurance outputs as 
p, = 
PREM, - PV(L,) 
PV(L,) 
(5) 
where PREM, is the real premium for output category i, L, measures 
the real losses for output category i, and PV is the present value opera-
tor. Thus, the price is the net real cost to the policyholders of having 
the present value of a dollar of real losses redistributed through the 
insurance company. 
The price of the intermediation output is the expected rate of return 
on assets, defined as the weighted average of our estimates of the ex-
pected returns on stocks and bonds. The weights are the proportions 
of each insurer's Investment portfolio held in stocks and bondsY Ex-
pected investment Income is the sum of the expected income on stocks 
and debt instruments. The expected rate of return on stocks for any 
given year is estimated as the average 90-day Treasury-bill yield for 
the year plus the expected equity risk premium for common stock with 
a beta coefficient of 1.0, assuming that insurers hold stock portfolios 
of average risk. 14 Using this approach smooths out fluctuations due to 
capItal gains and reflects the fact that investment decisions are based 
on ex ante rather than ex post returns. 15 For debt instruments, actual 
income was used as a proxy for expected income because variability 
13 Stocks. bonds, and short-term debt mstruments such as Treasury bills constitute 
about 96% of msurer mvestment portfohos In computmg the weights, other mvestments 
were assigned to the most appropnate category, e g , mortgages were assigned to the bond 
category, real estate to the stock category, etc 
14. The assumptIOn that msurer stock portfohos have average systemallc nsk IS reason-
able because msurers tend to hold broadly diverSified portfohos (Badnnath, Kale, and Ryan 
1996), so actual betas are not hkely to be far from our assumed value of 1 0 ThiS IS partly 
due to the generally conservallve mvestment approach taken by most msurers and partly 
due to regulallon Many states reslnct msurers from mvestmg more than a specified percent-
age of their assets m anyone stock and additionally restnct msurers from holdmg more 
than a specified fractIOn of any finn's stock Some states also hmlt the percentage of an 
msurer's total assets that can be mvested m stocks Dunng our sample penod, property-
hablhty msurers mvested between 13% and 19% of their assets m stocks so that our as-
sumptIOn that beta = 1 has only a small effect on the total measured pnce of the mtennedta-
tlon output. The maJonty of their portfolios m all years was mvested m mvestment-grade 
bonds. The highly pubhClzed msurance msolvenctes related to Junk bonds and real estate 
mvolved hfe msurers, rather than property-hablhty msurers 
15 By usmg market-based returns rather than actual returns m constructmg the pnce, 
we allow for the posslblhty of some finns bemg more effiCient m mvestmg. Insurers With 
consistently supenor mvestment perfonnance relallve to other msurers Will be appropn-
ately measured as more profit effiCient, all else equal. Insurers that take more nsk also are 
expected to have higher mvestment returns than msurers With more conservative portfohos 
However, m a competitive market, flskler msurers command lower pnces m msurance 
markets so that lower premIUm revenues would at least partly offset the higher Investment 
returns. 
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in debt returns across compames primarily reflects differences in the 
maturity structure of bond portfolios, not inefficiency.16 
Defining and Measuring Input Quantities and Prices 
Insurance inputs can be classified into four groups: labor, business ser-
vices, debt capital (including policyholder funds), and equity capital. 
We treat labor as a variable input and measure its price by a weighted 
average wage index derived from U.S. Department of Labor data on 
average weekly employee wages by state for Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) Class 6331: Fire, Marine, and Casualty Insurers. It is 
important to consider interstate differences in wages because the insur-
ers in our sample differ significantly in the geographic distribution of 
their business. We take a weighted average of weekly wages by state, 
using the proportions of an insurer's total premiums written III each 
state as weights (insurance employment by state is not available). The 
resulting series is indexed in real terms to 1982 using the CPI. The 
business services input category is dominated by outside business ser-
vices, such as loss-settlement services from lawyers and loss-settlement 
firms.17 The input price index for business services is calculated simi-
larly to the labor price index using SIC 7399, business services, by 
state. 
The final two inputs, which reflect the funding sources of the prop-
erty-lIability insurance industry, are treated as fixed netputs in our anal-
ysis. The debt capital of insurers consists primarily of funds borrowed 
from policyholders and is measured as the sum of loss reserves and 
unearned premium reserves. Loss reserves represent the company's ob-
ligations for unpaid losses, and unearned premium reserves represent 
premiums held for coverage not yet proVIded. Equity capital is an input 
for the risk pooling/bearing function because it provides assurance that 
the company will pay claims if they are larger than expected. Debt 
16. We also conducted tests usmg an alternative measure of the intermediation output 
pnce that reflects an ex ante bond return concept SpeCifically. we computed the portfolio 
weights for the insurers m the sample for three categories of mvestments: (a) Bonds With 
matunty greater than 1 year, (b) debt mstruments With maturity less than 1 year, and 
(c) stocks. Assets not fallmg mto one of the three categones were assigned to the most 
appropnate of the three categones For the ex ante return on bonds in category a, we used 
the Yield on 5-year Treasury bonds, for category b, we used the Yield on 6-month Treasury 
bills; and for category c, we used the 90-day Treasury-bill rate plus the beta = 1 CAPM 
nsk premIUm, as explained above. The Yields were weighted by the proportIOns of the 
three categones of assets m the portfolios of each msurer, and the weighted average Yield 
was used as the alternative measure of the pnce of the intermediatIOn output The results 
usmg this alternative mtermedlatIon output pnce measure were qualitatively the same as 
those reported m the article 
17 The costs of phYSical capital (mamly rental expenses and computers) are small rela-
tive to the other mputs, so we do not mclude a separate pnce for thiS type of mput. 
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and equity capital are expressed in 1982 dollars by deflating by the 
CPr. 
It might be argued that our two fixed netputs, debt capital and equity 
capital, are fixed only in the short run and may vary somewhat over 
our lO-year sample period in reaction to relative price changes. How-
ever, we prefer to hold these measures statistically fixed because the 
current distribution of insurer size evolved over a period of many de-
cades. That is, the smallest firms or even the average firms could not 
accumulate nearly as much policyholder debt capital or equity capital 
as the largest firms in a single decade. When we tried treating the capital 
variables instead as variable inputs, the profit-efficiency rankings were 
completely dominated by the largest firms, which had the hIghest 
profits for a given set of prices by virtue of their cumulative size. 
Thus, for the remainder of the analysis, we treat the capital inputs as 
fixed. 
To summarize, we specify five variable outputs-real discounted 
losses incurred on four types of insurance output (short- and long-tailed 
for both commercial and personal lines) and real invested assets. We 
also specify two variable inputs, labor and business services, and two 
fixed inputs, policyholder-supplied debt capital and financial equity 
capItal. These nine netputs-which are included in either quantity or 
price form in the cost- and profit-efficiency equations-should reason-
ably represent the conditions facing insurers as they attempt to mini-
mize costs and maximize profits. 
V. The Data 
The primary source of data for this study is the A. M. Best Company 
tapes, which are based on annual regulatory statements filed with state 
insurance commissioners. The distribution-free approach requires a 
panel of firms with data continuously available over a sufficiently long 
sample period to average out most of the random error. We chose the 
lO-year period 1981-90, the longest period for which all of the data 
were available to us. The decision-making units in the insurance indus-
try consist of groups of affiliated insurers under common ownership 
as well as individual, unaffiliated insurers. Our sample consists of all 
groups and unaffiliated insurers for which meaningful data were avail-
able over the sample period, a total of 472 insurers. These firms 
accounted for 88.9% of industry assets in 1985, the midpoint of the 
sample period, so that our results may be considered reasonably repre-
sentative of the entire industry. 
A few of the firms had incomplete information or mixed information 
on their distribution systems. Of the 472 insurers used in the efficiency 
estimations, 393 have clear distribution-system affiliations-l 14 direct 
writers and 279 independent-agency firms. Thus, while we include the 
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entire 472 firms in the efficiency estimation, we compare the average 
efficiencies of only 393 of them in order to make the clearest distinction 
for answering the question of why both distribution techniques persist 
in the market. Summary statistics on the variables used in estimating 
the models are presented in table 1. 
VI. Simple Hypothesis Tests Based on Average Inefficiencies 
We estimated the cost and profit models using ordinary least squares 
over the fulllO-year period 1981-90.18 The resulting inefficiency esti-
mates are summarized in table 2. The inefficiency ratios are categorized 
by distribution system and by insurer size quartile (smallest quartile = 
SIZE 1), with insurers ranked by total insurance output, which is the 
sum of the four insurance outputs (the total present value of real 
losses). 
The "Cost Inefficiency/Actual Costs" panel of the table provides 
estimates of cost inefficiency divided by actual predicted costs. These 
are estimates of the proportion of actual costs that are lost due to ineffi-
ciency. The results presented in table 2 are weighted averages, with 
weights proportional to predicted costs. The weighting allows us to 
view the averages as estimates of the proportions of total sample costs 
that are 10st.19 We report these estimates of cost inefficiency in part to 
determine whether the results of prior studies of insurance distribution 
systems, which focused exclusively on costs rather than profits, are 
robust to the choice of functional form and estimation methodology. 
The cost-inefficiency estimates are also important for evaluating our 
hypotheses to see what proportion of cost inefficiency remains as 
profit inefficiency. If the prior results were due to methodological 
flaws and, in fact, direct writers and independent-agency insurers were 
equally cost efficient on average, then there would be no economic 
puzzle of the long-term coexistence of two systems with different 
18 There are 4,720 total observatIOns used In the efficiency estimatIOns (472 firms X 
10 years) The recommended number of parameters to Include In Founer-flexlble specifica-
tIOns IS 4,7202/1, about 281 The full model In eq. (3) with a translog plus all first-, second-, 
and third-order Founer terms had 492 parameters. To reduce thiS number while maintaining 
symmetric treatment of all the outputs, we dropped all the third-order tngonometnc terms 
In which the same z terms appeared more than once (I e , the terms In the sum In which 
I = j, I = k, or j = k). For reasons of collineanty, we also dropped the second-order 
Founer terms In which both terms represented the vanable Input pnces. The remaining 
speCificatIOns had 324 parameters, reasonably close to the recommended number We note 
that F-tests of the null hypotheSIS that all the Founer coeffiCients were zero always rejected 
the null, confirming that the Founer-flexlble functIOnal form fits the data better than the 
more commonly speCified translog form The cost- and profit-function estimates are avail-
able from the authors 
19 We also conducted tests based on unwelghted averages, which give similar results 
and are available from the authors 




TABLE 1 Variables Used in the Cost and Profit Functions 
Sample Means In 1990 by Insurer Type 
Mixed MISSIng 
Direct Independent DlstnbutJon DlstnbutlOn 
0 Vanable DefimtJon Wnters Agency System System Total 
0 
""0 -::; N Number of finns 114 279 26 53 472 cO· 
;::!: S % stock 281 502*** 846 415 45.8 
@ VC Vanable costs 241.03 15269 5570 3296 155.24 
N It Profits 32.64 1460 11.57 483 17.70 0 
~ PI Price of labor Input 1104 1 111 ** 1238 1253 1 13 
~ P2 Pnce of matenals Input 1.038 1044 1 100 1 129 1.06 
= P3 Pnce of short -tad personal lInes output .576 668*** .564 .573 629 
;0 
P4 Pnce of short-tml commercIal lInes output 663 938*** .685 740 836 cO· 
::r P5 Pnce of long-tml personal lInes output .504 704*** 491 501 621 Cii 
;0 P6 Pnce of long-tad commercial lInes output 1041 1 110** 921 937 1.064 
CD P7 Pnce for real mvestment output 100 .104** 103 107 .103 CJ) 
CD Y3 Short -taIl personal hnes output present value of real losses 64.91 1522* 1008 361 2564 :< 
CD Y4 Short-tml commercial lInes output. present value of real losses 32.59 2215 23.48 14.00 2383 c. 
Y5 Long-tall personal lInes output present value of real losses 13891 4039* 7.85 705 5865 
Y6 Long-taIl commercial hnes output. present value of real losses 3752 49.91 1521 16.12 4121 
Y7 Output volume for real mvested assets 73410 41518 21267 13855 449.99 
Y8 Policy holders' real debt capital Input 54247 36242 16812 10868 366.71 
Y9 Volume of real eqUIty capItal Input 28090 14478 7969 6294 164.88 .... <:> 
= ., 
NOTE -Quantities are In mIlhons of real 1982 dollars := DO 
* Difference between dlrect-wnter mean and IOdependent-agency mean IS statlsllcally SIgmficant at the 10% level -
<:> ** Difference between dlrect-wnter mean and IOdependent-agency mean" 'tatlstlcally slgmficant at the 5% level .... 























TABLE 2 Average Cost and Profit Inefficiency 
Standard Profit Function Alternative Profit FunctIOn 
Cost Inefficiency I Profit Inefficiency I Profit Inefficiency I 
Cost Inefficiency I Actual Costs Potential Profits Potential Profits Potential Profits 
Dlfect Independent Direct Independent Direct Independent Direct Independent 
Wnters Agency t-Test Wnters Agency t-Test Wnters Agency t-Test Wnters Agency t-Test 
SIZE I 432 410 - 433 095 099 220 979 991 538 914 909 -078 
(17) (80) (17) (80) (17) (80) (17) (80) 
SIZE 2 332 438 2.448 .180 232 1758 903 927 .819 847 893 700 
(24) (73) (24) (73) (24) (73) (24) (73) 
SIZE 3 315 462 4406 509 .636 1270 644 712 1089 585 662 .815 
(30) (64) (30) (64) (30) (64) (30) (64) 
SIZE 4 314 424 4232 1.560 2211 1 861 193 .191 -.032 166 .161 -.071 
(43) (62) (43) (62) (43) (62) (43) (62) 
Total 341 .433 5149 I 184 1393 1244 .374 486 1985 320 422 1.477 
(114) (279) (114) (279) (114) (279) (114) (279) 
NOTE -Fmns are ranked by totalmsurance output (totdl present value of losses mcurred) SIZE I = smallest size group Values are the mefficlency ratIO With the number 
of observatIOns m parentheses EffiCienCies are weighted dverages for firms m each cell Weights = actual predicted costs or potential profits. Firms that sWitched their marketmg 
,ystem or for which the marketmg system IS unknown are omitted from thiS companson The I-tests measure the statistical slgmficance of the mefficlency differences between 
direct wnters and mdependent-agency firms m each size class for each effiCiency measure (cost. standard profit, and alternative profit) We also conducted I-tests of the difference 
between the ratios of cost mefficlency to potential profits and profit mefficlency to potential profits for firms m each size class usmg a given dlstnbutlon system For example, 
we tested the statistical ~Igmficance of the difference between the ratio of cost mefficlency to potential profits and the ratIO of profit mefficlency to potential profits for direct 
wnters m size class I, etc The results mdlcate statistically slgmficant differences between cost mefficlencles and (both standard and alternative) profit mefficlencles at the 5% 
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costs. Presenting cost-inefficiency estimates also enables us to com-
pare our results with those of prior frontier cost-efficiency studies in 
Insurance. 
Table 2 shows that independent-agency insurers are substantially 
less cost efficient than insurers using the direct-writing distribution sys-
tem. The average inefficiency for independent-agency firms is 43.3%, 
while the average inefficiency for direct writers is only 34.1 %, a statis-
tically significant difference of 9.2% of predicted costS.20 This result 
is consIstent with the prior literature on insurance distribution systems 
(Joskow 1973; Cummins and VanDerhei 1979; Kim et al. 1996). Thus, 
the finding that independent-agency firms have higher costs is ro-
bust to the choice of methodology and functional form. The marked 
difference in measured cost efficiency between direct writers and 
independent-agency insurers does not appear to be the result of differ-
ences in firm size. Direct wnters dominate Independent-agency firms 
in every size class except the smallest (SIZE 1), where there is a limited 
sample size of only 17 direct writers.21 
The cost inefficiencies In table 2 are high relative to the cost-
inefficiency estImates presented in prior studies of property-liability 
insurers (Weiss 1990; Cummins and Weiss 1993) and most prior stud-
ies of noninsurance financial institutions (see Berger and Humphrey 
1997) but lower than prior cost-inefficiency estimates for life insurers 
(Gardner and Grace 1993; Yuengert 1993; Cummins and Zi 1996). As 
demonstrated below, much of this measured cost inefficiency likely 
reflects variation in product quality even within a group of firms with 
the same distribution system. 
The profit inefficiency estimates are presented in the "Standard 
Profit Function" and "Alternative Profit Function" panels of table 2. 
As explained above, the standard profit function takes as exogenous 
the output prices, whereas the alternative profit function takes output 
quantities as given. The profit-inefficiency ratio is an estimate of the 
proportion of potential profits that is lost due to inefficiency. 
The profit function controls for differences in expenditures on ser-
vice quality for which the firm is compensated on the revenue side. 
Using the cost function alone would tend to measure differences among 
firms in service quality as inefficiency. That is, costs incurred by in sur-
20. Student's t-tests for differences between the dlrect-wnter and mdependent-agency 
means by size quartile and overall are provided m table 2 
21 The findmg that direct wnters do not appear to be more effiCient than mdependent-
agency msurers m the smallest size quartile IS consistent With Sass and Glsser (1989) 
They hypothesize that the dlrect-wntmg dlstnbutlOn system IS more hkely to be successful 
for larger finns because of the need to generate a suffiCient volume of busmess to support 
exclUSive agents 
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ers to provide higher-quality services would be measured as inefficien-
cies in the cost-function analysis. However, if the product market val-
ues these services and compensates insurers with higher revenues, then 
the higher costs will be offset by the added revenues, allowing the profit 
function to correct for the mismeasurement of cost inefficiency. Profit 
inefficiency should include only the "true" inefficiency component of 
the cost-inefficiency estimates plus any revenue inefficiencies and thus 
should net out any mismeasured cost inefficiencIes that arise from extra 
expenditures on product quality that are recompensed on the revenue 
side. 
The standard profit function results reveal that independent-agency 
firms also appear to be less profit efficient on average than direct writ-
ers. The average profit inefficiency for independent-agency insurers is 
48.6% and the average inefficiency for direct writers is 37.4%, a differ-
ence of 11.2% of predicted potential profits. Although this overall aver-
age difference is statistically significant, its level of significance is con-
siderably lower than that of the overall cost-inefficiency difference in 
the "Cost Inefficiency/Actual Costs" panel of the table; and none of 
the measured profit-inefficiency differences by size quartile are statisti-
cally significant, in contrast to the significant cost-inefficiency differ-
ences in size classes 2, 3, and 4. We WIll directly compare profit ineffi-
ciency with cost inefficiency below. 
The data in table 2 suggest that smaller firms are much less profit 
efficient than larger firms, with weighted average inefficiencies declin-
ing from more than 90% for size classes I and 2 to only about 19% 
for class size 4. There are three likely reasons for these measured profit 
scale economies. First, there may simply be strong scale economies in 
terms of insurer revenues. Since there appear to be no substantial cost 
scale economies or diseconomies within the range of observed insurer 
sizes, it may simply be the case that selling more insurance at a given 
set of input and output prices raises revenues more than costS.22 Second, 
there may be a measurement problem in companng the outputs of large 
and small firms because larger firms may engage in product sublines 
that are more service intensive and generate greater revenues. Third, 
there may be a scale economy bias in the measured profit efficienCIes 
because of the treatment of outputs as completely variable. As we ar-
gued above for treating debt and equity capital as fixed netputs, it may 
take many decades for firms to build up to the size of the largest insurers 
in terms of insurance output. For this reason, smaller firms may be 
22 As discussed by Berger, Hancock, et al (1993), profit effiCiency could be overstated 
III thiS circumstance If the firm could not sell ItS full-efficiency level of output Without 
lowenng pnces 
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compared to a frontier that is effectively unattainable. This problem 
does not occur for cost inefficiency because the cost equation treats all 
of the output quantities as exogenous. 
To determine whether the differing treatment of output between the 
cost and profit functions is responsible for the profit-efficiency scale 
effect, we also estimated an alternative profit function that specifies all 
outputs as fixed. That is, we replace the output prices in the standard 
profit function with output quantities, yielding an identical specification 
to the cost function except for the dependent variable. This alternative 
form also removes the one difference in specification between the cost 
equation and the profit equation, to be sure that our results are not 
related to specification. 
The alternative profit-inefficiency estimates shown in table 2 are gen-
erally comparable although somewhat smaller than the inefficiencies 
based on the standard profit function. Thus, the finding of very strong 
profit scale economies is robust and does not appear to be related to 
the profit-function specification. 
A comparison of the profit efficiencies with some commonly used 
indicators of profitability also suggest that our profit-efficiency mea-
sures are reasonably well behaved. The Spearman (rank-order) correla-
tion of profit efficiency with return on equity (ROE) is .22 and with 
return on assets (ROA) is .08, and both are statistically significant at 
the 1 % level. Finally, the average profit inefficiencies in table 2 suggest 
that insurers tend to lose about 30% to 50% of their potential profits 
to inefficiency. While these inefficiencies may seem high, they are 
comparable to the profit mefficiencies found for other financial instItu-
tions (Berger, Hancock, et al. 1993). 
To conduct the simple version of our test of the market-imperfections 
versus product-quality hypotheses, we compare the magnitudes of the 
average cost and profit inefficiencies. If most of the measured cost-
inefficiency difference between direct writers and independent-agency 
insurers remains as a profit-inefficiency difference, then the market-
imperfections hypothesis would be supported. In contrast, if most of 
the measured cost-inefficiency dIfference is eliminated when profit in-
efficiency is measured, then the product-quality hypothesis would be 
supported. 
The profit-inefficiency results shown in table 2 are not directly com-
parable to the cost-inefficiency results shown in the' 'Cost Inefficiency / 
Actual Costs" panel column of table 2 because cost inefficiency is 
measured in terms of the proportion of actual predicted costs that are 
wasted due to mefficiency, whereas profit inefficiency IS measured in 
terms of the proportion of potentIal profits that are lost. To put the cost 
and profit results in comparable terms, we restate cost inefficiency in 
terms of potential profits. The restated cost-inefficiency estimates, 
shown in the "Cost Inefficiency/Potential Profits" panel of table 2, 
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represent the proportion of potential profits that are lost due to cost 
inefficiency.23 Thus, for both costs and profits, we compute the ratio 
of the dollar value of inefficiency (actual costs minus minimum costs, 
potential profits minus actual profits) to potential profits. The profit-
inefficiency ratios should include all of the "true" inefficiency in-
cluded in the cost-inefficiency ratios plus any revenue inefficiencies 
and should net out any mismeasured cost inefficiencies that arise from 
extra expenditures on product quality that are recompensed on the reve-
nue side. 
The weighted average cost inefficiency for independent-agency in-
surers is an astounding 139.3% of potential profits.24 Thus, if the cost 
inefficiencies are to be believed, these firms are losing money on aver-
age. The profit inefficiencies, in contrast, are a weighted average of 
only 48.6% of potential profits. Simtlarly, measured cost inefficiencies 
exceed potential profits and far outstrip profit inefficiency for insurers 
using the direct-writing distribution system-measured cost ineffi-
ciencies consume 118.4% of potential profits, whereas profit ineffi-
ciencies consume only 37.4%. By definition, "true" cost inefficiencies 
can be no greater than profit inefficiencies since profit inefficiencies 
include both cost and revenue inefficIencies. Thus, these findings are 
consistent with the product-quality hypothesis, that is, the notion that 
measured cost inefficiencies primarily reflect unobserved differences 
in product quality that are recompensed on the revenue side, rather than 
true inefficiency, even among firms using the same insurance distnbu-
tion system. 
In our simple tests of the hypotheses, we compare the difference 
in measured cost inefficiency between direct wnters and independent-
agency insurers with the profit-inefficiency difference between the two 
groups. Independent-agency firms appear both more cost inefficIent and 
more profit inefficient than direct-writing msurers, but the measured 
cost-inefficiency difference IS much larger. The cost-mefficiency dif-
ference is 20.9% of potential profits (139.3% - 118.4%), whereas the 
profit-inefficiency difference between the groups based on the standard 
profit function is only 1l.2% of potential profits (48.6% - 37.4%), 
about one-half as large. The discrepancy is even larger when the com-
parison is based on the alternative profit function. The dIfference be-
tween the ratios of cost inefficiency to alternative potential profits (not 
shown in the table) for independent-agency and direct-writing insurers 
23. Potential profits from the standard profit functIon were used as weights for the re-
stated cost-mefficlency ratIOs shown m table 2 The results were similar when potential 
profits from the alternative profit function were used as weights 
24. The differences between the ratIOs of cost meffiCienCIeS to potential profits and both 
the standard and alternative profit-mefficlency ratios are statistIcally slgmficant at the 5% 
level or better for the entire sample and for each size quartile except quartile 3 Test results 
are available from the authors 
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is 28.8%, whereas the difference in alternative profit inefficiency IS 
only 10.2%. Thus, on the basis of both profit-function specifications, 
about half or more of the cost-mefficiency difference between the 
groups does not carry through as profit inefficiency. These results are 
consistent with the product-quality hypothesis: much of the measured 
cost inefficiency is not true inefficiency but rather the costs of providing 
better service. 
The difference between the cost-inefficiency-to-potential-profits ra-
tios for direct writers and independent-agency insurers is not statisti-
cally significant for the overall sample (it is significant for size classes 
2 and 4), although it is much larger than the profit-inefficiency-ratio 
difference and is statistically significant when predicted costs are used 
as the denominator. As shown next, however, the cost-inefficiency-to-
potential-profits difference is statistically significant in the sophisti-
cated-hypothesis tests, which use regression analysis to control for 
other firm characteristics affecting inefficiency. 
VII. Sophisticated Hypothesis Tests Conditioning 
on Firm Characteristics 
The sophisticated tests of the market-imperfections and product-quality 
hypotheses control for firm characteristics besides distribution systems 
that may be affecting the measured inefficiencies of direct-writing and 
independent-agency insurers. For example, if organizational form 
(stock versus mutual ownership structure) affects the efficiency of in-
surers and if the distribution system is statistically related to organiza-
tional form, then the average differences in measured inefficiency be-
tween direct-writing and independent-agency insurers could be the 
result of organizational form rather than distribution system. Table I 
shows that independent-agency firms are much more often organized 
as stock companies than are direct writers, so part of the measured 
difference in efficiency between the two groups could reflect an under-
lying difference in efficiency between stock and mutual forms of orga-
nizatIOn. 25 Differences in business mix and scale could have similarly 
confounding effects. As discussed above, it is difficult to change out-
puts by substantial amounts except over a period of decades. 
Accordingly, we regress the cost- and profit-inefficiency ratios from 
table 2 on a dummy variable for whether the firm is a direct writer 
(independent agency is the omItted category) and also include controls 
for organizational form, product mix, and scale to see if the effect of 
25. It would not be appropnate to control for such charactenstIcs directly III the cost 
or profit functIOns because there may be real effiCiency differences between finns With 
different orgamzatIonal forms that would be Illcorrectly removed If orgamzatlOnal fonn 
vanables were Illcluded III the cost or profit functIons 
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being a direct writer on efficiency is altered by these other variables. 
The sophisticated tests provide our best evidence on the product-quality 
and market-imperfections hypotheses because they control for impor-
tant factors besides distribution systems that may affect efficiency. 
The cost-inefficiency regressions are presented in table 3.26 The de-
pendent variable in these regressions is the ratio of the measured cost 
inefficiency to potential profits. Five versions of the regression model 
are presented, with different combinations of the control variables. 
Model 1 includes dummy variables for distribution system, organiza-
tional form, and size class. The variable DIRECT gives the effect of 
being a direct writer as opposed to the base case of being an indepen-
dent-agency firm, STOCK gives the effect of being a stock firm as 
opposed to the base case of being a mutual organization, and SIZE 2, 
SIZE 3, and SIZE 4 give the effects of being in the largest three size 
classes as opposed to the base case of being In the smallest size class. 
As shown, the coefficient of DIRECT is -0.367, implying that direct 
writers are a predicted 36.7% more cost efficient than independent-
agency firms of the same organizational form and size class. This find-
ing reinforces the results presented in table 2 and suggests an even 
larger cost-inefficiency difference between insurers using the two types 
of distribution systems after controlling for other factors. The other 
coefficients in model 1 suggest that organizational form is not impor-
tant for determining the proportlOn of potential profits lost to cost inef-
ficiency and that larger firms are less cost efficient. 
Model 2 adds control variables for product mix, defined as the ratios 
of insurance output by category to total insurance output. Three output 
proportions are included: long-tail personal lines and long- and short-
tail commercial lines. The long-tail commercial lines proportion is the 
omitted category. Inclusion of these variables (along with all the con-
trols for organizational form and scale variables) accounts for the possi-
bility that some firms may be stuck with SUboptimal product mix for 
historical or regulatory reasons, at least over the sample period. The 
regression results show that the coefficient of DIRECT becomes 
slightly larger in absolute value, -0.457, and is again statistically sig-
nificant, further supporting the robustness of our result that direct writ-
ers maintain a measured cost advantage over Independent-agency in-
surers. 
Models 3, 4, and 5 test the cost-efficiency effect of distribution sys-
tems using interaction termsY We Interact DIRECT and STOCK with 
26. FIfteen of the firms analyzed m table 2 were omitted from the regressIOns because 
of mlssmg mformatlOn on organIzatIOnal form Omlttmg these firms m calculatmg the 
averages m table 2 had no matenal effect on the results 
27 We deliberately did not mclude mteractIon terms m models 1 and 2 to test whether 
the results are robust to the mciuslOn or exclUSIOn of mteractlons Models 1 and 2 thus 
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a measure of insurer size, LN (INS OUT), the natural log of total insur-
ance output (discounted real losses for the four lines of insurance). The 
purpose of switching to the continuous measure of scale instead of the 
three dummies used in models 1 and 2 is to conserve on the number 
of interaction terms. These interaction terms allow the effects of distri-
bution system and organizational form to differ by insurer size. In order 
to determine the effect of distribution system from these equations, that 
is, the effect on the dependent variable of DIRECT, we take the deriva-
tive with respect to DIRECT at the mean value ofLN(lNS OUT). That 
is, we evaluate aCIIaDIRECT = ~ + y LN(lNS OUT) at the mean 
of the data, where CI is the cost inefficiency ratio and ~ and yare the 
coefficients of DIRECT and LN(INS OUT)· DIRECT, respectively. 
We similarly compute derivatives with respect to the STOCK form of 
ownership. The values of these derivatives are shown in the bottom 
rows of the table.28 
In model 3, we include DIRECT, STOCK, the scale variable LN (INS 
OUT), and the interactions of the scale variable with the other two 
variables. In model 4, we add the controls for product mix. In model 
5, we also add back in the dummy variables for size class to allow for 
an extra noncontmuous effect of size. The derivatives with respect to 
DIRECT shown in the bottom row of the table continue to confirm the 
results of the first two models, indicating that direct writers have a 
statistically significant measured cost advantage of 34% or more over 
independent-agency insurers in terms of potentIal profits.29 
Table 4 shows the same five regression equations as table 3, the 
only difference being that the dependent variable is the ratio of profit 
inefficiency to potential profits.30 The derivatives WIth respect to 
provIde a bndge between the SImple means tests presented In table 2 and the more complI-
cated regressIOn specIficatIOns, models 3, 4, and 5. 
28 Note that whenever we Include LN(INS OUT) In the InteractIOn tenns, we also 
Include Its level to be an extra control van able and also to be sure that the InteractIOns 
are not plckmg up the Independent effect of sIze 
29 We also conducted regreSSIOns that Included InteractIOn tenns between the organIza-
tIOnal fonn and dlstnbutlOn-system dummy vanables (e g , DIRECT STOCK) and Interac-
tIons between these categOrIcal InteractIon vanables and other varIables such as finn sIZe 
(e g, DIRECT STOCK LN[INS OUT]) The results, avaIlable from the authors, are 
qualItatIvely SImIlar to those presented In tables 3 and 4 The only noteworthy dIfference 
occurred In the most fully specIfied cost-IneffiCIency models (analogous to models 3-5 In 
table 3), where there IS no SignIficant dIfference In ineffiCiency between duect-wntIng 
and Independent-agency stock Insurers, whereas the effiCIency advantage of dIrect-wrIter 
mutuals over Independent-agency mutuals IS statIstIcally SignIficant and ranges from 32.8% 
to 46 9% A possIble explanatIon for thIS findIng IS the KIm et al (1996) hypothesIs that 
the Independent-agency system helps to control owner-polIcyholder conflicts III the stock 
fonn of ownershIp, leadIng to lower agency costs that may offset the cost-efficIency advan-
tage of the dlrect-wntIng dlstnbutlOn system. 
30 AgaIn, potentIal profits are based on the standard profit functIOn so that the denomi-
nator of the dependent varIable IS the same as In table 3. RegreSSIOns based on potentIal 
profits from the alternatIve profit functIon yIelded SimIlar results 




















TABLE 3 Regressions of Cost Inefficiency on Firm Characteristics 
Model I Model 2 
Vanable Coefficient t-Ratlo Coefficient t-Ratlo 
INTERCEPT 145 1451 592 3540 
DIRECT -.367 -3459 -.457 -4053 
STOCK .050 526 011 103 
LONG-TAIL PERSONAL - 529 -2430 
SHORT-TAlL COMMERCIAL - 558 -2788 
SHORT-TAIL PERSONAL - 492 -1844 
SIZE 2 140 1083 123 939 
SIZE 3 570 4.330 .535 3982 
SIZE 4 1.998 15 155 2.009 14731 
LN(lNS OUT) 
LN(lNS OUT) DIRECT 
LN(INS OUT) STOCK 
Adj. R2 439 452 
Number of ObservatIOns 378 378 
aCIIaDIRECT - 367 -3459 - 457 -4053 
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- 363 -1.361 
- 317 -2.034 




- 075 -1511 
487 
378 
- 411 -3614 
- 045 -.448 
NOTE -Dependent vanable = CI = dollar value of cost mefficlency/potentml profits The mean of LN(INS OUT) = the mean of the natural log of msurance output = 
16503 (to calculate the denvatlve of the meffiCiency ratio With respect to the drrect-wnter dummy vanable 10 models 3, 4, and 5) The denvatlve With respect to DIRECT IS 

































TABLE 4 Regressions of Profit Inefficiency on Firm Characteristics 
Modell Mode12 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Vanable CoefficIent t-RatIo CoefficIent t-RatIo CoefficIent t-RatIo CoeffiCIent t-RatIO CoefficIent (-RatIO 
INTERCEPT 1.032 4563 988 2583 2782 1961 2787 1847 2.479 10472 
DIRECT -.033 -1383 - 020 -.792 171 923 258 1 318 .155 807 
STOCK - 048 -2261 - 039 -1664 188 1 142 239 1.399 .139 .808 
LONG-TAIL PERSONAL 069 1394 .072 1500 083 1.795 
SHORT-TAIL COMMERCIAL 027 .587 - 069 -1.599 - 027 - 651 
SHORT-TAIL PERSONAL 071 I 163 016 268 017 .296 
SIZE 2 - 055 -1872 -.060 -2012 094 2868 
SIZE 3 - 266 -8921 - 270 -8.781 042 945 
SIZE 4 - 686 -2301 - 697 -22.36 - 106 -1519 
LN(INS OUT) -.122 -1371 - 123 -13616 - 106 -6701 
LN(INS OUT) DIRECT - 012 -1117 -017 -1447 -010 - 911 
LN(INS OUT) STOCK -.014 -1.348 - 016 -1.508 -010 - 941 
AdJ R2 657 658 700 705 731 
Number of ObservatIOns 378 378 378 378 378 
aPIIaDIRECT - 033 -1383 - 020 - 792 - 033 -1193 -017 - 732 - 015 -.581 
aPIIaSTOCK - 048 -2261 - 039 -1.664 - 035 -1517 -017 - 642 -.022 - 923 
NOTE -Dependent vanable = PI = dollar value of profit IneffiCIency/potential profits The mean of LN(INS OUT) = the mean of the natural log of Insurance output = 
16503 (to calculate the denvatlve of the IneffiCiency rdno WIth respect to the dlfect-wnter dummy vanable In models 3, 4, and 5) The denvatlve With respect to DIRECT I' 
(the coeffiCient of DIRECT) + (for model, 3, 4, and 5) [the coeffiCient of LN(INS OUT) DIRECT] [the mean of LN(INS OUT)] ThiS table I, based on profit IneffiCiency 
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DIRECT in table 4 range between -1.5 and -3.3 percentage points 
of potential profits, suggesting that direct writers may be only slightly 
more profit efficient than independent-agency firms, considerably 
smaller than the 11.2 percentage point difference shown in table 2. 
Moreover, none of the derivatives of DIRECT in table 4 is significantly 
different from zero. 3l 
The results provide much stronger support for the product-quality 
hypothesis than for the market-imperfections hypothesis. That is, the 
differences in measured cost mefficiency shown in table 3 appear to 
reflect unmeasured differences in product quality (service intensity), 
which are recompensed by additional revenues, so that there are no 
statistically significant differences in profit inefficiency between direct 
writers and independent-agency firms on the basis of table 4. 
VIII. Conclusion 
This article addresses the economic puzzle of why alternative distribu-
tion systems with significantly different costs are able to coexist by 
provIding frontier cost- and profit-efficIency estimates for the property-
liability insurance industry. This industry provides an ideal laboratory 
for testing alternative hypotheses about the coexistence of distribution 
systems with different costs because the independent-agency system 
is known to have higher costs for distributing virtually the same insur-
ance contracts as the direct-writing system. We test the market-
imperfections hypothesis, under which impediments to competition 
allow independent-agency insurers to be less efficient, against the prod-
uct-quahty hypotheis, under which independent-agency insurers incur 
higher costs providing more or better services for which they are rec-
ompensed with higher revenues. 
Our methodology for resolving thIS controversy involves comparing 
31. We also conducted two addJ. tlOnal robustness checks (1) To check to see If dIffer-
ences m portfolIo composItIon across msurers mIght be affectmg the results, we modIfied 
our cross-sectIOnal regressIOns by addmg three portfolIo compOSItIon vanables (the propor-
tIons of each msurer's portfolIo mvested m stocks, bonds, and short-term debt mstru-
ments-the three most Important mvestment categones for property-lIabIlIty msurers). The 
portfolIo compOSItIon vanables were not statIstIcally slgmficant m the cost-mefficlency 
regressIOns (analogous to table 3) and had no matenal effect on the cost-mefficlency dIffer-
ences or slgmficance tests between dIrect wnters and mdependent-agency firms The port-
folIo vanables were statIstIcally slgmficant III the profit-Illefficlency regressIOns (analogous 
to table 4) but had no matenal effect on the dlstnbutlOn-system Illefficlency dIfferences 
or sigmficance tests. Thus, we do not beheve that dIfferences III portfolIo compOSItIOn are 
affectmg the conclUSIOns drawn from our analYSIS (2) We reestImated our models umlttlllg 
from the sample the largest and smallest 10% of firms III terms of total msurance output 
The conclUSIOns are the same there IS a statIstIcally slgmficant dIfference m cost Illeffi-
clency but no slgmficant dIfference m profit mefficlency between dlrect-wntmg and mde-
pendent-agency Illsurers The results based on the averages (analogous to table 2) also 
support SimIlar conclUSIOns after omlttmg firms III the largest and smallest sIze declles 
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the frontier cost and profit mefficiencies of insurers employing the al-
ternative distribution systems. In our simple tests, we compare the aver-
age cost and profit inefficiencies of direct-writing and independent-
agency firms. Under the product-quality hypothesis, higher measured 
cost inefficiencies for independent-agency firms represent higher-
quality serVIces that are rewarded by the market with higher rev-
enues, so that the profit-inefficiency differences between the two distri-
bution systems should be much smaller on average than the measured 
cost-inefficiency differences. In contrast, under the market-imperfec-
tions hypothesis, most of the measured cost-inefficiency differences 
reflect' 'true" differences in inefficiency between the two systems that 
should also be measured as profit-inefficiency differences. In our so-
phisticated tests, the average inefficiency differences are measured after 
conditioning on factors that may not be fully under the control of insur-
ers in the short run. These tests are based on regressions in which orga-
nizational form, business mix, and scale are included as controls. 
Our empirical results confirm that independent-agency firms are less 
cost efficient on average than direct writers. The principal finding of 
the study is that most of the average cost-efficiency difference between 
the two groups of firms does not carry through as a profit-efficiency 
difference. This is a robust result that holds both m our simple tests 
of average efficiency and in our sophisticated tests using regression 
analysis. On the basis of averages, the profit-inefficiency difference IS 
about one-half, or less, as large as the cost-inefficiency difference. On 
the basis of the regression analysis, the profit-inefficiency differences 
are about one-tenth as large as the cost-inefficiency differences, and 
the profit-inefficiency differences are not statistically significant. We 
prefer the more sophIsticated regression analysis, which suggests that 
independent-agency firms are predicted to generate almost the same 
profitability for delivering the same mix and quantity of outputs under 
the same organizational form. The results thus provide much stronger 
support for the product-quality hypothesis than for the market-imper-
fections hypothesis. The hIgher costs of independent-agency firms ap-
pear to be due primanly to the provision of higher-quality services, 
which are compensated for by additional revenues. 
These findings have potentially Important imphcations for efficIency 
studies in other industries. They suggest that relying on cost efficiency 
alone may produce misleading results, unless appropriate controls are 
available for product quality. Such controls often are not available, es-
pecially m the services sector where outputs are often intangible and 
implicitly priced. The estImation of profit efficiency may be necessary 
to mitigate this problem and YIeld more meaningful efficiency esti-
mates. 
A sigmficant public policy Implication is that regulatory decisions 
perhaps should not be based on costs alone. Our findings Imply that 
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cost differences among insurers are mostly attributable to service dif-
ferences rather than to inefficiency and therefore do not represent social 
costs. Thus, using regulatory rate suppression as a policy mechanism 
to reduce marketing costs, as proposed in some states, may deprive 
some market segments of desired services and adversely affect eco-
nomic welfare. 
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